A political community that cannot decide and act for itself is not sovereign. That is Gaullism’s central insight. The tradition emerged from Charles de Gaulle’s leadership of Free France and took institutional form in the Fifth Republic’s strong executive, appeal to national unity and pursuit of strategic independence.

Gaullism was nationalist because France was its political subject. Eurogaullism changes the subject by expanding the political “we.” It seeks for a European federation what de Gaulle sought for France: independence abroad, unity and continuity at home, and the capacity to sustain both. De Gaulle resisted supranational European government, but Eurogaullism reverses his conclusion. Europeans must pool sovereignty within a federation not to surrender self-government, but to recover collectively the powers their states can no longer exercise alone.

Independence Without Isolation

In 1966, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command to preserve control over its armed forces and nuclear deterrent. It rejoined the integrated command in 2009 while retaining its nuclear autonomy. The principle was alliance without dependence.

A federal Europe should similarly integrate with allies wherever integration multiplies its power. But it must retain the ability to defend itself, command operations, produce arms, gather intelligence and sustain deterrence without another power’s permission or rescue.

An ally coordinates by choice and acts without permission. A client does neither.

Such autonomy can be achieved by a European federation. Twenty-seven states acting separately are increasingly unable to achieve it as their capacity for independent action diminishes. It follows that as long as national vetoes can stop Europe from acting, European sovereignty cannot emerge.

Eurogaullism therefore requires federalising high politics—foreign affairs, defence and deterrence—while preserving subsidiarity elsewhere. It centralises only what collective independence and sovereignty require and leaves the rest to the lowest effective level of government.

An Executive That Can Act

The Fifth Republic answered instability by strengthening the executive and making the president a guardian of the institutions. Europe needs a comparable centre of authority, adapted to a federal constitution.

Sergio Fabbrini argues that a European federation would be a “coming-together” federal union: one composed of established states with different sizes, histories and national identities. Such a federation cannot safely locate all political legitimacy in one temporary parliamentary majority. Its citizens and constituent states need distinct channels of representation.

The American and Swiss systems, both examples of “coming-together” federal unions, give their executives and legislatures reciprocal security of tenure. Neither can dismiss the other over political disagreement. This compels cooperation across institutions, parties and territories, while denying a single parliamentary victory automatic control of the entire federation.

Eurogaullism would give Europe a strong federal president, elected for a fixed term under rules requiring both popular and territorial breadth. The president would represent the federation, direct foreign and defence policy, and guarantee constitutional continuity.

But strong must not mean unchecked. The president should be constrained by a coequal bicameral legislature—with the Council of the European Union replaced by a federal senate representing the constituent states—as well as by independent courts, enumerated federal powers, term limits and removal for serious misconduct. The president would stand outside daily coalition bargaining, but not above the law.

Markets, With a Strategic State

Classic dirigisme does not scale fairly to the European level. In a diverse federation, choosing “European champions” soon becomes bargaining over whose firm, factory or subsidy wins. Competitive markets are the least nationally arbitrary default because they allow capital and contracts to follow performance rather than intergovernmental bargaining.

Eurogaullism must therefore be market-oriented but stop short of laissez-faire. Federal industrial policy should be limited to strategic sectors such as defence, energy security, space and critical infrastructure. Even there, the state should seek, where possible, to work through markets rather than substitute for them—creating markets where necessary and using competitive procurement, co-investment and other market-based mechanisms to pursue strategic goals.

De Gaulle wanted France to remain capable of deciding and acting for itself. His legacy need not end with the defence of an ever narrower national autonomy; France can carry it forward by becoming a leading architect of European strategic independence. In the twenty-first century, only by acting together can Europeans preserve the capacity to decide their own future rather than have it decided by others.